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Studies of public support for war highlight the importance of context. Most people 
do not simply support or oppose the use of force but instead assess its merits 
depending on various aspects of the situation. One such aspect is the extent of 
international backing ± whether from individual states or supranational 
organisations ± for military action. This backLQJPD\EH µDFWLYH¶QRWDEO\ WKURXJK
WKH FRQWULEXWLRQ RI WURRSV RU PRUH µSDVVLYH¶ WKURXJK WKH HQGRUVHPHQW RU
authorisation of action. In this article, a survey experiment, embedded in a major 
internet survey of British foreign policy attitudes (N=2,205), is used to explore how 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO EDFNLQJ DIIHFWV SXEOLF VXSSRUW IRU PLOLWDU\ DFWLRQ %ULWDLQ¶V PLOLWDU\
SRWHQWLDODQGUHFHQWKLVWRU\PDNHLWDQREYLRXVFDVHVWXG\KHUH%RWKµDFWLYH¶DQG
µSDVVLYH¶EDFNLQJSURYHWRKDYHVHSDUDWHDQGVLJQLILFDQWSRVLWLve effects on support. 
Importantly, the absolute number of troops involved matters far less than the 
proportion of total troop numbers to be contributed. And the perceived strength of 
the enemy predicts support only when the British are to contribute a large 
proportion of total forces. Predispositional variables are used to investigate the 
sources of the experimental effects but with little success: the impact of international 
backing proves remarkably consistent across the sample. 
 
Recent debates about possible Western military action in Libya and Syria were dominated by 
the question of the breadth of the international coalition needed to legitimise such action, 
with heavy emphasis on the need to obtain UN Security Council resolutions authorising 
intervention. In Britain as elsewhere, the background ± indeed, the foreground ± to those 
GHEDWHVZDVWKH,UDTZDULQZKLFKWKH8.ZDVMXQLRUSDUWQHUWRWKH86LQDµFRDOLWLRQRIWKH
ZLOOLQJ¶ WKDW WRRN DFWLRQ ZLWKRXW H[SOLFLW 81 DXWKRULVDWLRQ DQG LQ WKH IDFH RI FRQsiderable 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO RSSRVLWLRQ 7KLV ZDV DQ H[DPSOH RI WKH EUDQG RI µOLEHUDO LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVP¶
pursued by former Prime Minister Tony Blair in which military intervention on humanitarian 
grounds was deemed justified even in the absence of authorisation from international 
organisations. That doctrine in general, and its application in Iraq in particular, have come 
under close scrutiny. Meanwhile, British forces have been in Afghanistan for over a decade 
as part of a NATO mission which has seen simmering disagreements about whether some 
allies are not shouldering their fair share of the military burden. In short, the nature and extent 
of international support is a prominent element in elite debates about military action, in 
Britain as elsewhere. 
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This article is about whether and how British public support for war is also influenced 
by the international backing for military action. Numerous academic studies have 
demonstrated the importance of public backing to governments considering the use of force 
(e.g. Gartzke, 2000; Kadera et al., 2003; Reiter, 2003; Sullivan, 2008), and popular support ± 
or the lack of it ± has been a prominent topic in elite discussion and media coverage of the 
Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts. So this question about mass opinion is well worth asking. It is 
also worth asking about publics beyond the US, where the large majority of academic 
research on public support for war has been conducted.  The US is obviously atypical in its 
capacity for unilateral action and so it is useful to broaden the evidence base to a country like 
Britain which, while retaining the potential for acting alone, is more obviously in need of 
international backing.   
There is another important respect in which we advance the literature in this field.  
Previous work on international backing has tended to blur or neglect the distinction between 
µSDVVLYH¶ VXSSRUW ± that is, some kind of endorsement of the use of force ± DQG µDFWLYH¶
support in the form of a tangible contribution to military action. Existing research cannot 
readily indicate which of these weighs heavier in public judgements about military action, 
and whether there are inidividual differences in that relative importance.  By addressing those 
issues, we gain insight into whether international support matters more because of its 
legitimising effects or more because it increases the chances of success and minimises the 
costs ± for instance, in terms of casualties ± of action.  
Our primary means of addressing these questions is a survey experiment in which we 
manipulate the degree of international backing and record the effects on support for the use of 
force. The experimental approach is increasingly used in this broader field but has only 
recently featured in the specific literature on international backing and support for war 
(Brooks and Valentino, 2011). We begin by reviewing that literature, identifying the reasons 
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why ± and conditions under which ± we would expect international support to translate into 
public support. Having set out the data, measures and experimental design to be used, we 
report results showing that the British public is broadly multilateralist and that even those 
sceptical about military action can be persuaded to support it as part of a wider force. We 
conclude by discussing the validity and implications of our findings. 
 
International backing and public support for war 
One prominent strand of research into public support for war has been concerned with 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶ SUHGLVSRVitions to support military action. Scholars have specified a range of 
values and ideological principles that citizens can use to lead them to decisions on foreign 
policy issues. Prominent among these ideological dimensions are internationalism versus 
isolationism (Wittkopf, 1990), militarism versus accommodation (Holsti, 2004; Alvarez & 
Brehm, 2002, ch. 9), national chauvinism (Herrmann et al., 2009) and broader political 
ideology (Russett et al., 1994). While most of this research has been based on the US public, 
there seems no reason to doubt that the basic point holds in Britain and elsewhere. Core 
beliefs and values leave some people strongly predisposed against military action, but others 
far readier to support the use of force. 
However, predispositions are only part of the story. Most people will endorse the use 
of force in certain circumstances but not in others. Public opinion researchers have largely 
FHDVHG WR UHJDUG VXFK µLQFRQVLVWHQF\¶ DV HYLGHQFH RI QRQDWWLWXGHV VHH $OPRQG 
Converse, 1964). Rather, it demonstrates the sensitivity of public opinion to context (Zaller, 
1992; Alvarez & Brehm, 2002). A vast range of specific contextual or situational factors can 
affect public support for military action, both initially ± at the outset of the war ± and as the 
conflict progresses. Examples include the objective of military action (Jentleson, 1992; Oneal 
et al., 1996), the extent of domestic elite consensus (Zaller, 1992; Dixon, 2000), casualty 
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rates (Gartner & Segura, 1998; Karol & Miguel, 2007), and the extent of international 
backing, from other states or supranational organisations (Kull & Destler, 1999; Holsti, 2004; 
Smith, 2005). 
The last of these is our central focus in this article. There are several reasons why 
international support for a military intervention might translate into greater public support, 
and the relative importance of these depends on whether that international backing comes 
from supranational bodies or from one or more other single-actor states. A first possibility, 
suggested by Isernia and (YHUWVLVµthat over the years people have internalised, 
as it were, the rules of international law¶ ± which prohibit the use of force unless in self-
defence or with the authorization of the UN Security Council. Few citizens are likely to know 
the precise legal position but many more will have grasped that unilateral action is less 
legitimate. Applying a ³domestic DQDORJ\´ would lead to a similar conclusion, unilateral 
action failing to meet democratic criteria of deliberation and consent (Russett, 1993). These 
points apply particularly to the authorisation of force by international organisations but, even 
if this is lacking, support from other states ± LQ µFRDOLWLRQVRI WKHZLOOLQJ¶± can also boost 
public approval. In particular, this support serves as a heuristic for judging the extrinsic 
characteristics of a military intervention, notably its justifiability and effectiveness. 
Difficulties in attracting international support are likely to spark public doubt not only about 
the success of any military campaign but also about the worthiness of the cause.  
The distinction between supranational and multi-national support cross-cuts another 
important distinction, EHWZHHQ ZKDW PLJKW EH FDOOHG µSDVVLYH¶ RU µPRUDO¶ DQG µDFWLYH¶
support. In the case of other states, this amounts to the difference between words ± statements 
endorsing the use of force ± and deeds.  Those deeds could take many forms ± financial 
backing, permission to use air space, sending in troops, and so on ± and, since some of these 
VHHP UDWKHU PRUH µDFWLYH¶ WKDQ RWKHUV, the passive-active variable is perhaps more of a 
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continuum than a dichotomy. With supranational organisations, meanwhile, the words-deeds 
distinction is blurred: a UN Security Council Resolution represents more active backing than 
support from an individual country. Nonetheless, the nature of backing provided by, say, the 
UN or NATO can be located along the same continuum. 
The passive-active distinction has been underplayed in the existing literature. One 
exception is Eichenberg¶VPDMRUFURVV-national analysis of polling data which showed 
that support for military intervention was boosted by both µthe endorsement of the 
international community through formal mandates and the deployment of international 
IRUFHV¶ (p. 56).  We build on that basic finding, not only by bringing individual-level data to 
bear on the matter but also looking in more detail at the relative importance of the two types 
of support, at whether they operate additively or in interaction, and at the different signals 
that they might send to domestic citizens. Passive support is a stronger cue about the 
justification than about the effectiveness of the use of force; the reverse is true of active 
support.1 
In these areas, as in most spheres of foreign policy opinion, it is the US public that has 
been most thoroughly surveyed. Yet this is anything but a typical case. Since the USA¶V
military power and global role give it unparalleled capacity to act unilaterally, we might 
H[SHFW LQWHUQDWLRQDOEDFNLQJQRW WRZHLJKKHDYLO\ LQ LWVFLWL]HQV¶ MXGJHPHQWVDERXWPLOLWDU\
action. It is therefore striking that the US public in fact takes a strongly multilateral view of 
the use of force.2 The results of a 1998 survey, in which only 23% of respondents said that µin 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFULVHVWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVVKRXOGµWDNHDFWLRQDORQH¶LWLIGRHVQRWKDYHWKHVXSSRrt 
RI LWV DOOLHV¶ (Page & Barabas, 2000, 358), are illustrative of a more general rejection of 
                                                 
1
 $OWKRXJKWKH\GHDORQO\ZLWKSDVVLYHVXSSRUWLQWKHIRUPRI81DSSURYDO%URRNVDQG9DOHQWLQR¶V
intriguing results are at least indirectly relevant here.  They find that the usual gender gap in support for military 
action is eliminated, even reversHGLQWKHFDVHRIIRUFHHQGRUVHGE\WKH816LQFHWKRVHDXWKRUV¶EURDGHUFDVH
LVWKDWFRPSDUHGWRPHQ¶VZRPHQ¶VVXSSRUWIRUZDULVGULYHQPRUHE\HWKLFDODQGOHVVE\VWUDWHJLF
considerations, they effectively make the same argument: that passive support is more about legitimising 
military action than about improving its chances of success. 
2
 The extent of this multilateralism is underestimated by elites (Kull & Destler, 1999) and even by the public 
itself (Todorov & Mandisodza, 2004). 
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unilateral action (Holsti, 2004; Kull & Destler, 1999). International backing is valued 
particularly when it comes from supranational organisations. Chapman and Reiter (2004) find 
that ³UDOO\-round-the-IODJ´ effects are stronger where the UN Security Council has sanctioned 
military action, but also that public approval is not necessarily boosted by a multilateral 
approach in the absence of Security Council support. This is consistent with surveys showing 
strong support for the UN and NATO, including widespread willingness to participate in 
peacekeeping operations under the auspices of those organisations (Kull & Destler, 1999; 
Page & Barabas, 2000). Beyond the military context, there is broader US public support for 
burden-sharing with other nations. As Todorov and Mandisodza note: µin the last seven years 
the group of Americans who think that the United States should do its fair share in solving 
international problems has been more than four times larger than the group of Americans who 
think that the United States should be the preeminent world leader in solYLQJVXFKSUREOHPV¶ 
(2004, 343; see also Kull & Destler, 1999). 
To date, there has been no systematic study of the impact of international backing on 
British popular support for war. But existing evidence bearing on this issue points to a British 
public that is still more multilateralist than its US counterpart. This difference between the 
two countries is predictable JLYHQ%ULWDLQ¶Vmuch more limited capacity for acting alone.3  If 
the difference is also rather narrow then this has more to do with the perhaps surprisingly 
multilateral approach of the US public than with any strong strain of unilateralism in Britain. 
The 2002 Transatlantic Trends project included both survey questions and an embedded 
experiment concerning possible action in Iraq and, in both cases, µthe legitimacy conferred by 
a UN mandate had an even greater importance for the British public than for the French or 
*HUPDQ UHVSRQGHQWV¶ (Isernia & Everts, 2004, 249). In a later (2008) survey reported by 
                                                 
3
 A game-theoretic DSSURDFKFRXOGOHDGWRWKHRSSRVLWHFRQFOXVLRQDERXWWKHHIIHFWRIDFRXQWU\¶VPLOLWDU\
strength in this context. The publics in smaller and less powerful states might reason that, if international 
support is plentiful, then the marginal benefit of their participation is minimal and hence exceeded by the costs. 
3XWWKHRWKHUZD\URXQGµLIQRRQHHOVHLVJRLQJWRGRVRPHWKLQJDERXWWKLVWKHQZH¶OOKDYHWR¶
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Reifler et al. (2011), a majority of respondents agreed (and only a quarter disagreed) that 
³Britain should not use its armed forces abroad unless it gets approval from the United 
Nations´. Such multilateral instincts also show up in longitudinal studies of mass support for 
ZDU %URQVNL DQG :D\¶V  DQDO\VLV VKRZV WKDW LQ %ULWDLQ DV LQ WKH 86 WKH SXEOLF LV
more inclined to rally round the flag in cases of joint military action.4 Finally, Younger 
(1964) suggests that, even in the decades following the Second World War, when the public 
PLJKWEHH[SHFWHGWRKDYHEHHQPRUHFRQILGHQWLQ%ULWDLQ¶VFDSDFLW\WRDFWDORQHWKHUHZDV
nonetheless widespread support for the UN and for general internationalism. 
These consistently multilateral attitudes are noteworthy given that, twice in the last 
thirty years, British governments have taken what was basically unilateral action ± in the 
Falkland Islands (in 1982) and in Sierra Leone (2000). Moreover, in the former case, the UN 
explicitly opposed that action.5 Yet both interventions were largely successful and the 
Falklands, in particular, enjoyed strong public support (Clarke et al., 1990; Price & Sanders, 
1993). If anything, it is more recent joint actions, especially those in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
whose justification and effectiveness has been called into question by the public. This is not 
necessarily out of line with the notion of a multilateralist British public. For one thing, as 
noted at the outset, much of the controversy over the Iraq War concerned the lack of support 
from the international community and the legal wrangling over whether action was UN-
authorised. For another, it may be that those interventions enjoyed WKH µZURQJ NLQG¶ RI
multilateral support. More specifically, the (dominant) presence of the US in those µFRDOLtions 
RIWKHZLOOLQJ¶may now send a less powerful signal about the likely effectiveness of action, 
and could even have a delegitimising effect. The speculative tone of this discussion reinforces 
the case for systematic analysis of the conditions under which international backing boosts 
                                                 
4
 Lai and Reiter (2005) are more inclined to equivocate on this point, probably because the limited number of 
cases for observation makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions. 
5
 While the Security Council did pass a resolution calling on Argentina to withdraw from the Falklands, its 
resolution also called on both sides to seek a diplomatic resolution and to desist from further military action.  
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British public support for military action. Such analysis needs not only to distinguish 
supranational organisations from other states as providers of support, but also to consider the 
particular impact of key potential allies. 
In the upcoming methods section, we describe how the various aspects of 
international backing were operationalized. For now, we cast hypotheses in general terms. 
The first two are straightforward and concern the main dimensions of international support:  
H1: The greater the international passive backing, the greater the public support for 
military action 
H2: The greater the international active backing, the greater the public support for 
military action 
The two dimensions are obviously related: contributions of troops and equipment will 
presumably only come from states or organisations that are committed to the cause, and the 
public might well expect that vocal backing for the use of force will translate into active 
contributions. Although our experimental method gives us some scope for enforcing the 
GLVWLQFWLRQ WKH OLNHOLKRRG RI µVSLOORYHU¶ PDNHV LW GLIILFult to predict the nature of any 
interaction between active and passive backing. Such interaction could be positive, the public 
deeming both necessary in order for a mission to be justified and likely to succeed, or 
negative, the public seeing little benefit in wider moral support provided that extensive active 
backing is available. Hence, while we can test for that interaction, we do not specify a 
directional hypothesis about its nature.  
However, we do specify two further hypotheses about the impact of active backing. 
The first emphasises that public dissatisfaction at a lack of active support does not simply 
reflect strategic calculations about WKH JUHDWHU ULVN WR %ULWDLQ¶V WURRSV There is also a 
normative point that the public is likely to resent having to do more than its perceived fair 
share (Smith, 2005, 500). It may therefore be that the public would prefer a mission in which 
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a major deployment of British troops forms a small proportion of the total force over a 
mission in which, while the overall burden carried by the British is lighter, its share of the 
effort is greater. We therefore hypothesise: 
H3: Public support depends more on BULWDLQ¶VUHODWLYHWKDQDEVROXWHFRQWULEXWLRQWR
military action 
This is not to say that strategic considerations play no part in these judgements. There are 
a number of situational factors that seem likely to interact with international backing in 
shaping public support. Examples include the purpose of the war, the weight of national 
interests at stake, and the strength of the enemy. To avoid over-complicating the 
experimental design and losing statistical power, we were obliged to choose among these 
and we focus on the latter since it raises the particularly immediate question of the threat 
posed to British forces. The hypothesised interaction is: 
H4: International backing has a greater impact on public support for military action 
when the adversary is stronger 
 
Who will go it alone? Predispositions and reactions to international backing 
Herrmann et al. (1999) use a series of survey experiments to demonstrate the impact of both 
SUHGLVSRVLWLRQVDQGVLWXDWLRQDO IDFWRUVRQ WKH$PHULFDQSXEOLF¶VVXSSRUW IRUPLOLtary action. 
7KH\DOVRKLJKOLJKW WKHLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQSUHGLVSRVLWLRQVDQGFRQWH[W ,QWKHLUµFRJQLWLYH-
LQWHUDFWLRQLVW¶IUDPHZRUNWKHZD\that people respond to specific situations depends on their 
general values and attitudes. For instance, while respondents were on the whole readier to use 
force when US interests were clearly at stake, this difference was far greater among those 
VFRULQJKLJKRQµPLOLWDU\DVVHUWLYHQHVV¶; less militarist respondents remained reluctant to take 
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the likelihood that the British public will not react homogenously to our key variable, 
international backing, when considering military action. 
A variety of predispositions are potentially relevant in this context. The first is the 
militarism variable mentioned in the example just above. Assuming that we see a similar 
pattern to that reported by Herrmann et al., then international backing would persuade those 
already disposed to consider the use of force but would not convert those sceptical about 
military action. (The reverse interaction would imply that militarists need no such persuasion 
but that international backing can temper pacifist instincts.) In line with a distinction drawn 
earlier, we examine two strands of militarist predispositions: whether the use of force is 
regarded as generally justifiable and as generally effective. This enables us to assess whether 
the different dimensions of international backing tend to convince citizens of the moral or of 
the practical case for military action.  
Herrmann et al. (1999, 563-4) also found an interaction between internationalist 
predispositions and situational factors and the same seems likely here.  We might expect 
internationalists to be especially responsive to the extent of foreign backing for action while, 
almost by definition, isolationists are unlikely to be coaxed into action overseas simply 
because other nations or supranational organisations are also involved.6 Admittedly, the 
interDFWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS KHUH GHSHQGV RQ ZKLFK RI WKH µWZR IDFHV¶ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVP LV
involved (Wittkopf, 1990; Holsti & Rosenau, 1993). While militant internationalists may 
prefer their country to take action alone, it is cooperative internationalists who are more 
likely to be persuaded of the merits of military action if it wins cross-national or 
supranational backing.  
7KH ILQDO VHW RI SUHGLVSRVLWLRQV WKDW ZH H[DPLQH LV FLWL]HQV¶ SULRU DWWLWXGHV WR WKRVH
international actors that might lend support to military action. The more respect that people 
                                                 
6
 Or we might see a non-monotonic pattern, with international backing unnecessary for the committed 
internationalist, irrelevant to the resolute isolationist, but able to convince those in the middle of that continuum. 
We test for such curvilinearity but stick to the simpler hypothesis here. 
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have for, say, the UN, the more likely it is that UN backing will convince them of the case for 
military action. This effect could result from quite detailed cognitive processing, as citizens 
update their judgements about the likely justification or effectiveness of military action based 
on their perceptions of the records, capacities and motivations of the international actors 
involved. Or it could be a very simple application of what Sniderman et al. (1991) call the 
µOLNDELOLW\KHXULVWLF¶WKHPHUHDVVRFLDWLRQRIPLOLWDU\DFWLRQZLWKDGLVOLNHGREMHFWLVHQRXJK
to turn someone against that action. 
This leads us to a series of hypotheses about the moderating effect of the various 
predispositions: 
H5: The impact of international backing on public support for military action is 
VWURQJHURQWKRVH« 
a) generally predisposed to regard military action as justified 
b) generally predisposed to regard action as effective 
c) scoring higher on internationalism 
d) favourably disposed towards the international actor giving passive support  
 
Methods, data and measures 
The main empirical basis for this study is a survey experiment. Using a design similar to that 
reported by Brooks and Valentino (2011), we presented respondents with a vignette 
concerning potential military action and aspects of that vignette ± notably the degree of 
international backing for action ± are manipulated. We describe the experiment in details 
shortly. It is first worth briefly noting the key advantage of an experimental design. This 
centres on internal validity and, specifically, the power of experimental control and random 
assignment to permit causal inference (Morton and Williams, 2008). Studies of aggregate 
opinion, investigating the covariation of public support and the degree of international 
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backing, are useful (see especially Eichenberg, 2006) but VXIIHUIURPDµWRRPDQ\YDULDEOHV
WRRIHZFDVHV¶SUREOHP Researchers not only lack control over other situational factors but 
are also unsure about whether and how the extent of international backing was perceived by 
the public. 
An experiment also offers an external validity advantage over the alternative most 
prominent in the literature, namely the hypothetical survey question in which respondents are 
asked ± either about military action in general or about a particular war ± whether they would 
be more likely to approve of action were a given international actor to support it. Such a 
question is available in the survey analysed here and the responses provide a useful scene-
setter in our results section.  However, the strength and blatancy of the cues in such 
hypothetical questions means that they are liable to overstate effect sizes. Hence we turn to 
the experiment for a more valid test of our hypotheses. Of course, experiments come with 
their own external validity problems ± a point to which we return in the concluding section ± 
and so it is advisable to take a multi-methods approach to research questions like these. Our 
study does not supplant but supplements previous research. 
 
Data 
This experiment was included in a major three-wave survey study of foreign policy attitudes 
among the British public.7 The surveys were fielded on the internet by YouGov, whose 
approximately 300,000 panel members formed the sampling frame.8 The company has an 
impressive track record of sampling and weighting to achieve representative samples of the 
                                                 
7
 These data are archived and available for replication studies at http://dataservice.ac.uk. 
8
 Most of these are actively recruited (by targeted campaigns via non-political websites) rather than volunteering 
for the panel. Similarly, respondents are not able to choose in which surveys to take part: they are either sampled 
for a given data collection or not. Political surveys, especially those covering relatively esoteric issues like this 
one, are the exception rather than the rule for most panel members ± PXFKRI<RX*RY¶VGDWDFROOHFWLRQLVLQWKH
fields of market research or more general opinion polling. Respondents are paid small incentives for taking part, 
typically around £1 for surveys of 10-15 minutes like each wave of this study. 
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British electorate ± as measured by their accuracy in predicting election results.9  Several 
recent analyses of British foreign policy attitudes have been conducted using YouGov survey 
data (e.g. Reifler et al., 2011; Johns and Davies, 2012; Clements, 2013).   
The study was not a traditional panel. The aim was rather to divide a long instrument 
into manageable chunks and to field these at brief intervals so that the entire process of data 
collection took less than a month. The key methodological details of the three waves of 
fieldwork are set out in Table I, which also indicates the waves from which the questions 
used in this article are taken. The core experiment was fielded in the second wave of data 
collection while the survey measures used come from various points in the survey. 
[Table I about here] 
 
Survey experiment and situational variables 
The experimental vignette is presented in the form of a brief newspaper report. It refers to a 
country threatened by a more powerful neighbouring state and the issue at stake is whether 
Britain should send in troops to defend the country under threat.10 We follow the example of 
Herrmann et al. (1999) and Brooks and Valentino (2011) in referring to hypothetical rather 
than actual countries. The full vignette, with manipulations highlighted in bold, is below.  
 
Next, here is a question about a situation in which Britain might take military action. 
Please read the following short newspaper story and then answer the question. 
  
³Today the British government announced that it will send troops to Country A to 
defend it against threats from its larger neighbour, Country B. This mission, which has 
the support of the USA/the support of NATO/the support of the UN/yet to win any 
significant international support, will send 1,000/10,000 British servicemen and 
women to fight in the region. Other countries have been willing/unwilling to commit 
                                                 
9
 In a mode experiment fielded as part of the 2005 British Election Study, Sanders et al. (2007) showed that the 
covariance structures ± and hence the conclusions about party choice and turnout ± generated from a YouGov 
internet sample were not significantly different from those generated from a traditional face-to-face sample. 
10As a case of aggressor restraint, this is the kind of scenario found by Jentleson (1992) to win strongest support 
(at least in the US public).  This should be borne in mind when considering the overall level of approval for 
military action recorded in our experiment.  It is also worth considering whether the moderating effect of 
international backing might be greater in certain scenarios.  With that in mind, we avoided making any explicit 
reference to the threatened state being an ally of Britain, in case that implied such a strong ethical obligation to 
intervene that even those normally reluctant to act alone would feel compelled to do so (Smith, 2005, 495-6).   
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forces and so British forces will make up 10%/90% of the total troop numbers. 
According to Professor John Irving, a leading expert on the region, the potential 
invader Country B has a large and well-trained/small and not very well-trained 
military´  
 
Four situational features of the story were thus subject to random manipulation: the extent of 
passive support (from the USA, NATO, the UN, or non-significant); active support, i.e. the 
proportion of total troop numbers contributed by Britain (10% or 90%); troop numbers (1,000 
or 10,000); and adversary strength (large and well-trained or small and not very well-trained 
military). The relative complexity of this 4 x 2 x 2 x 2 design means that the large total 
sample size (of well over 2,000) is particularly important. It also means that some of the 
experimental manipulations, having just two conditions, are rather unsubtle. In particular, we 
ZRXOGLGHDOO\KDYHEHHQDEOHWRYDU\%ULWDLQ¶VVKDUHRIWURRSGHSOR\PHQWVEH\RQGDVLPSOH
µQHDUO\DOO¶YHUVXVµKDUGO\DQ\¶ As it was, we sought roughly to replicate with percentages 
the extremes of the passive support variable ± with Britain either fighting more or less alone 
or as part of a major international force ± and thus to allow for at least broad comparison of 
the effects of passive and active support. For similar reasons, we specified two conditions for 
troop numbers that varied by roughly the same order of magnitude as the troop percentages.11 
The newspaper story is followed by two questions ± shown below ± providing 
dependent variables for the upcoming analyses. The second question is included partly to 
force respondents to come down on one side of the fence and partly to provide a simple 
µSHUFHQWDJHVXSSRUW¶ILJXUHWRHDVHFRPSDULVRQV 
 2QDVFDOHIURPµVWURQJO\RSSRVH¶WRµVWURQJO\VXSSRUW¶KRZGR\RXIHHODERXWWKH
decision to send British troops to Country A? 
 $QGLI\RXKDGWRFKRRVHµRSSRVH¶RUµVXSSRUW¶ZKLFKZRXOG\RXJRIRU" 
 
Additional variables 
                                                 
11
 Another constraint on calibrating the manipulations was the need to avoid logical impossibilities. For 
example, we could not tell respondents that the mission enjoyed no international support whatsoever and then 
announce that Britain was contributing anything less than 100% of the fighting force. 
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We hypothesised interactions between international backing and three predispositional 
variables: militarism, internationalism, and attitudes to international actors. As noted, we 
measure two variants of militarism, concerning the justification and effectiveness of military 
action:  
 Next, some questions about the use of military force. The first asks: do you think the use 
of force can be morally justified? 2QDVFDOHIURPWRZKHUHPHDQVµGHILQLWHO\
FDQQRWEHMXVWLILHG¶DQGPHDQVµGHILQLWHO\FDQEHMXVWLILHG¶ZKLFh number best 
represents your view? 
 In general, how effective do you think the use of military force is? On a scale from 0 to 
ZKHUHPHDQVµQRWDWDOOHIIHFWLYH¶DQGPHDQVµYHU\HIIHFWLYH¶ZKLFKQXPEHUEHVW
represents your view about the use of force? 
 
Internationalism is measured with a short battery of three Likert items using the standard 
five-point agree-disagree format. (Asterisked items are reverse-scored.) The items are 
adapted from measures used by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987).  
 Britain shoXOGQ¶W ZRUU\ DERXW ZRUOG DIIDLUV EXW MXVW FRQFHQWUDWH RQ WDNLQJ FDUH RI
problems at home* 
 Britain needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world 
 Britain is too small a country to be out policing the world* 
 
While an alpha coefficient of 0.71 means that this scale meets conventional reliability 
criteria, it does not allow us to distinguish cooperative from militant internationalism but is 
instead a more general measure of internationalist-isolationist orientations. 
The questions measuring attitudes to the UN and NATO were worded as follows: 
 Thinking now about international organisations, how much respect ± on a scale from 0 
µQRUHVSHFWDWDOO¶WRµDJUHDWGHDORIUHVSHFW¶± do you have for the following? 
The question measuring attitudes to the USA (among other countries) was slightly different 
 Now we would like to know how you feel about particular countries these days. Please 
UDWH\RXUIHHOLQJVDERXWHDFKRQHRQDVFDOHIURPWRZKHUHPHDQV\RXµVWUongly 
GLVOLNH¶DQGPHDQV\RXµVWURQJO\OLNH¶WKDWFRXQWU\ 
 
 
Finally, as noted, the survey also included a hypothetical question about military action under 
different circumstances in terms of international backing or alliances: 
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 Military action could be undertaken by Britain alone or in coalition with other countries. 
Under which of the following circumstances do you think it would be acceptable for 
Britain to take military action? (Please tick all that apply or, if you think military action 
would never EHDFFHSWDEOHFKRRVHµQRQHRIWKHVH¶ 
o As part of a United Nations operation 
o As part of a European Union operation 
o As part of a NATO operation (that is, with our closest North American and 
European allies) 
o Along with the USA and its partners 
o Acting alone 
o None of these 
 
Results 
We present the results in three sections. First, we report responses to the hypothetical survey 
questions about international backing and support for action. Then, turning to the experiment, 
we analyse whether and how support depended on the manipulated factors. In the third 
section, we estimate more complex models testing for interactions between situational 
variables and predispositions. 
 
Survey question on international backing 
This question, about the conditions under which military action would be acceptable, was in a 
µWLFNDOOWKDWDSSO\¶IRUPDW The first column of data in Table II contains the percentages of 
respondents deeming action as acceptable in that case. These describe broadly the anticipated 
pattern: the wider the international coalition, the greater the support for action. The scale of 
the difference, a gap of around forty points between a UN coalition and acting alone, is 
consistent with results from opinion polls such as the one on Libyan action cited above.  
There is an obvious exception to this µZLGHUFRDOLWLRQHTXDOVVWURQJHUVXSSRUW¶ rule, however, 
which is that support from the USA does nothing to increase the perceived acceptability of 
the use of force. Respondents¶ reasoning can only be inferred but it seems highly likely that 
this reflects popular doubts about the legitimacy of recent US-led coalition action, notably in 
Iraq.   
[Table II about here] 
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The 72% support for participation in UN operations is notable for two reasons. First, 
it is only slightly (though statistically significantly) higher than the NATO figure, suggesting 
WKDW PRVW DUH VDWLVILHG ZLWK VXSSRUW IURP %ULWDLQ¶V WUDGLWLRQDO DOOLHV DQG GR QRW GHPDQG
backing from those global powers ± such as Russia or China ± that have tended to withhold 
support. Second, it leaves 28% of people who would not approve of that most inclusive form 
of action. As the bottom row of the table confirms, these are not committed pacifists who 
renounce action regardless of circumstances ± that was true of only 8% of the sample. In 
other words, most of those who rejected action with the UN supported action in at least one 
of the other circumstances. 
This highlights a more general point that these responses are not hierarchically 
ordered as in a Guttman scale. Aside from the European Union (included in Table II for 
comparative purposes but not included in the experiment and therefore not of primary interest 
for this articleHDFKRSWLRQOLVWHGLQWKHTXHVWLRQLVµQHVWHG¶LQ WKHSUHYLRXVRSWLon: that is, 
components are successively removed from the coalition but new elements are not added. It 
might be expected that everyone supporting action in a given circumstance would also 
support action under a wider coalition. That this is not the case is demonstrated by the matrix 
to the right of the table, in which we report the percentage of those saying µ\HV¶RQWKHURZ
YDULDEOH WKDW DOVR VDLG µ\HV¶ RQ WKH FROXPQ YDULDEOH If these responses approximated a 
Guttman scale, many of the proportions below the diagonal should approach 100%. Most fall 
some way short. The most obvious case is that mentioned earlier concerning US support: not 
much more than half of those who support acting alone would also support participating in an 
American-led coalition. Yet one in six (17%) of those who would act alone would actually 
reject participation in UN or NATO operations ± these look like militant rather than 
cooperative internationalists. In addition, and belying the impression given by the basic 
percentages, support for UN and NATO missions does not come from more or less the same 
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people. Only three-quarters (76%) of those endorsing UN missions were also happy to see 
Britain working with NATO. These patterns do not imply any irrationality (of the kind 
sometimes inferred from intransitive preferences) on the part of respondents. Rather, they are 
testament to the complexity of the relationship between international backing and approval 
for military action. It is not (only) the extent but also the sources of support that drive public 
judgements. 
 
Experimental results: i) situational factors 
In Table III we show how approval of military action in defence of Country A differs across 
subgroups on the first three experimental variables. We use the dichotomous dependent 
variable in order to obtain simple percentages of support and use Ȥ2 tests to identify any 
significant effects. The first column of data reports the overall breakdown while the panel to 
the right illustrates how these effects are moderated by the fourth experimental variable, the 
military strength of the adversary.12 
[Table III about here] 
The experiment offers clear support for H1 about passive support. Public support 
declines significantly along with international backing and the pattern of decline is quite 
similar. Although these results suggest that US involvement has at least some scope to boost 
public approval, the difference between the bottom two categories is not statistically 
significant.13 The most notable contrast between these results and those in Table II is that the 
overall effect of international support is weaker. This is consistent with the earlier argument 
that the strength of cues in hypothetical survey questions tends to magnify the effect of the 
                                                 
12
 The Ȥ2 tests in the right-hand panel are of interaction terms from loglinear modelling of the three variables 
involved: adversary strength, the other experimental variable in question, and the dependent variable. 
13
 Any difference could have less to do with the role of the US and more to do with the different wordings of the 
EDVHFDWHJRU\µ$FWLQJDORQH¶DVLQWKHVXUYH\TXHVWLRQPD\VXJJHVWZLOOLQJQHVVWRLQWHUYHQHZKHUHQHFHVVDU\
even if others fear to do so, whereas the experimental wording ± µKDV\HWWRZLQDQ\VLJQLILFDQWLQWHUQDWLRQDO
VXSSRUW¶± implies that the international community has considered and dismissed the case for action.  
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variable in question. Even this brief vignette introduces other contextual details that make 
SDVVLYHVXSSRUWMXVWRQHFRQVLGHUDWLRQLQUHVSRQGHQWV¶MXGJHPHQWV 
 There is also clear support for H2 about active backing. When British troops were a 
relatively small part of the total fighting force, respondents were markedly and significantly 
more supportive of action than when British forces were more or less acting alone. These 
results suggest that passive and active backing have similar impacts, with a 12- or 13-point 
gap between unilateral action and the most multilateral option. Of course, whether the effect 
sizes can be compared in this way depends on whether we achieved our aim in calibrating the 
two manipulations in parallel. Calibration is an inexact business but the similarity is 
noteworthy, as is the contrast between the strong and significant effect of troop percentages 
(relative contribution) and the non-significant effect of troop numbers (absolute contribution). 
This strong support for H3 looks unlikely to be a mere artefact of calibration. Finally, turning 
to the right-hand panel, we find some support for H4 ± that international support is more 
important when the enemy is stronger ± but only in the case of active support. Adversary 
strength has a predictable main effect ± there is less public support for fighting a large and 
well-trained enemy ± but does not appear to interact with passive backing. The general 
reluctance to undertake unilateral action did not melt away at the prospect of a relatively 
simple operation. However, there was a noticeable and significant interaction with relative 
troop contribution. If Britain was to supply only 10% of forces, the strength of the adversary 
KDGQRDSSUHFLDEOHLPSDFWRQSXEOLFDSSURYDOEXWWKHHQHP\¶VPLOLWDU\FDSDFLW\KDGTXLWHD
strong influence where Britain was to be fighting more or less alone. One interpretation of the 
difference is that passive support largely concerns the justification while active support 
largely concerns the effectiveness of military action, and adversary strength is factored into 
calculations of the latter but not the former.14  
                                                 
14
 7KHUHLVOLWWOHVLJQRIDQLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQDGYHUVDU\VWUHQJWKDQG%ULWDLQ¶VDEVROXWHFRQWULEXWLRQIXUWKHU
suggesting that troop numbers are not central to these calculations about effectiveness.  
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Experimental results: ii) introducing predispositions 
In order to introduce predispositions into the analysis, we turn to ANOVA using the 
alternative seven-point scale dependent variable.15 Before testing the interactive hypotheses 
H5(a)-(d), in Table IV we first report two models: the first includes only the experimental 
variables while predispositional controls are added in the second in order to allay suspicions 
that the experimental effects may be due to differences across groups in predispositions 
towards military action.  The table includes F-statistics (and accompanying significance 
values) and partial eta Ș a measure of effect size.16  
[Table IV about here] 
Model 1 confirms the results from Table III.  The only conclusion that needs any 
modifying is the suggestion that passive and active support have roughly equal impact. 
More formal measurements of effect size suggest that active support matters rather more 
(although this comes with the usual caveat about calibration of experimental 
manipulations). One other point worth noting about the effects of situational factors is the 
lack of any further significant interactions. In particular, there is no sign of any interaction 
between passive and active support. Rather than either being a sufficient or necessary 
condition for public support, their effects seem to be purely additive. 
Model 2 shows that introducing the predispositional covariates leaves the core 
findings from the experiment unaffected. Predictably, many of these attitudinal variables 
have substantial main effects (and so R2 increases sharply). The influence of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVPLVSDUWLFXODUO\FOHDUPDUNHGO\VWURQJHUHYHQWKDQWKRVHRIUHVSRQGHQWV¶
                                                 
15
 The use of ANOVA is vindicated by the fact that responses to the dependent variable quite closely 
approximated a normal distribution (echoing the earlier point that few citizens are enthusiastically supportive of 
or flatly opposed to military action). 
16
 We use ȘUDWKHUWKDQWKHPRUHFRPPRQȘ2 because its interpretation is closer to that of standardised regression 
coefficients, and more mundanely because the higher values (avoiding a flood of zeros) ease comparison across 
effects and across models. 
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general attitudes towards the use of force. Indeed, from the point of view of evaluating 
the experimental effect sizes, it is striking that the impact of active backing is as strong as 
WKDWRIUHVSRQGHQWV¶EHOLHIVDERXWWKHMXVWLILDELOLW\RIPLOLWDU\DFWLRQ This is another clear 
example of public judgements about war being shaped as much by the situation as by 
their predispositions. 
However, our main interest in these predispositions is as moderators of the impact 
of international backing.  We therefore estimated Model 2 from Table IV but adding 
interaction terms between international backing and each of the six predispositional 
variables.17 Including all of the interaction terms, many of them involving the same 
categorical variables, in the same model would have risked serious collinearity problems 
and so instead we estimate six versions of the expanded model, one for each 
predisposition in turn. To save space, we do not report estimates for all of the variables 
already dealt with in Table IV. Instead, each row in Table V represents a model and we 
just report the relevant interaction terms alongside the increase in R2 resulting from their 
inclusion.   
[Table V about here] 
The key result here is the shortage of significant interactions. Judging by the 
healthy sample size and the feeble effect sizes, this is not a case of multiple Type II 
errors. It seems instead that the impact of international backing on support for war is 
surprisingly consistent across the public. More specifically, there is no support for H5(c) 
or (d). Internationalists were more likely than isolationists to favour intervention, 
regardless of the circumstances. But the two types reacted in the same ways to 
                                                 
17
 Since we have no theoretical reason to suppose that attitudes to international actors would moderate the effect 
of active support (which in the vignette came from unnamed sources), our models omit those interactions. 
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international support, either passive or active, showing the same relative reluctance to act 
alone but much greater willingness to intervene with support from the UN or NATO.18  
The lack of support for H5(d) is even more striking. A vast amount of research in 
social and cognitive psychology leads us to expect that those with a positive view of an 
international actor should be disproportionately ready to take action alongside that 
organisation or state. Instead, even if respondents entered the experiment with a sharply 
critical view of the UN, they were just as likely to be prompted by UN backing into 
supporting military action. The same applies to NATO and the USA, the latter case 
particularly striking because it undermines DQ\µQRQDWWLWXGH¶explanation for the null findings.  
Maybe prior attitudes to the international organisations had little moderating effect because 
they were top-of-the-head evaluations of unfamiliar organisations, but it is harder to believe 
that is true of the like-dislike ratings of the USA.  We discuss this counter-intuitive findings 
further in concluding the article. 
There is at least some support, albeit mixed, for H5(a) and (b). When it comes to 
passive backing, militarism can be added to the list of predispositions showing no interaction 
with situational variables. :KDWHYHU UHVSRQGHQWV¶ SULRU YLHws on the justifiability or 
effectiveness of war, they reacted in the same way to the accumulation of moral support from 
partner states or organisations. However, these beliefs did moderate the effect of active 
backing. The two significant interaction effects are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows how 
WKHHIIHFWRI%ULWDLQ¶VVKDUHRIWURRSFRQWULEXWLRQVGHSHQGVRQSULRUEHOLHIVDERXWZDU For the 
SXUSRVHVRILOOXVWUDWLRQZHVHSDUDWHJURXSVµORZ¶DQGµKLJK¶RQHDFKVWUDQGRIPLOLWDULVPE\
dividing the two scales around their midpoint (and omitting those respondents choosing the 
                                                 
18
 Moreover, the curvilinearity hypothesis mentioned above ± that international backing is less relevant for the 
most isolationist (who would oppose intervention anyway) and the most internationalist (who would favour 
intervention anyway) ± can also be rejected. We split respondents into three groups of roughly equal size along 
the isolationism-internationalism dimension and re-estimated the model using that trichotomous variable as a 
factor. It had the expected powerful main effect but no significant interaction with either active or passive 
support. 
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midpoint). The columns in the chart represent estimated marginal means in support for 
action.  Error bars, denoting the 95% confidence interval for each estimated mean, are also 
included. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
These interactions are not especially strong ± neither has a partial eta reaching 0.1 ± 
and so it is not surprising that, in Figure 1, they are overshadowed by the main effects of both 
variables (especially effectiveness). Nonetheless, there is a discernible and consistent pattern 
in line with H5(a) and (b). The extent of active support has only limited impact on those who 
regard force as hard to justify or not particularly effective anyway. It weighs more heavily in 
the judgements of those who are already more open to the military option. We can therefore 
echo the conclusion drawn by Herrmann et al. from their parallel analysis of militarism as a 
moderator of reDFWLRQVWRWKHFRQWH[WRIZDUµmilitarists are not simply knee-jerk hawks who 
XVHIRUFHDWHYHU\RSSRUWXQLW\UDWKHUWKH\DUHGLVFULPLQDWLQJDQG«OHDGHUVFDQQRWFRXQWRQ
them to support the use of force if the interests at stake UHPDLQDPELJXRXV¶ (1999, 563). 
One final point to note is the lack of evidence supporting our earlier suggestion that 
passive support would be linked more closely to the justification of military action while 
active support would say more about its likely effectiveness. The two non-significant 
interactions for passive backing imply that this moral support was able to convince 
respondents across the board ± that is, including some of those initially resistant to the use of 
force ± of both the ethical and the practical case for military action. Equally, the two very 
similar patterns of interaction with active backing suggest that it was no more able to 
convince sceptics of the effectiveness than of the justification of military action.   
 
Conclusions 
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Our primary aim in this study was to test whether the British people are happier for their 
government to take military action when such action has international backing. The point had 
so far mostly been assumed or inferred ± here, we provide direct evidence that international 
support does translate into greater public support. This is not an especially surprising finding. 
Many other Western publics, notably in the US, have also been shown to favour multilateral 
action.  In addition, our data were collected in the shadow of the Iraq war, by that point a 
highly unpopular engagement often criticised for a lack of international consensus and 
legitimacy.  Indeed, perhaps the more surprising aspect of the results is the weakness of the 
international backing effects in our experiment. While our survey question ± in line with 
other surveys (e.g. Isernia & Everts, 2004) and polls ± found a huge gap of 41 points between 
support for participating in a UN operation and support for acting alone, the corresponding 
experimental difference was just 13 points.  Almost half of the sample approved unilateral 
action in the case described in the vignette. Perhaps, in practice, the British public might turn 
out to be rather less multilateral than has been supposed. 
 This conjecture raises the question of the external validity of the experimental results. 
We would argue that they are more valid than hypothetical survey questions in which 
international backing is the only cue provided. Indeed, since our vignette includes only a 
fraction of the contextual detail that would be involved in a real-world situation, it could be 
argued that even those subtler cues are still unrealistically prominent. The impact of 
international backing could in practice be even weaker. On the other hand, in public discourse 
about military action, the extent of international support will be not just mentioned but 
thoroughly discussed. It may be that, once the reasons for and implications of a lack of 
backing are threshed out, the public becomes more responsive to that aspect of the situation.   
 That point, about the implications of (a lack of) international backing, in turn raises an 
issue of internal validity.  Sher and McKenzie (2006) note the possibility in experiments of 
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µLQIRUPDWLRQOHDNDJH¶ZKHUHE\UHVSRQGHQWVLQIHUDGGLWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQEH\RQGWKDWwhich is 
explicitly cued in the manipulation. In that event, we do not know whether it is international 
backing or the inferences drawn from it that drive the dependent variable. Where British 
troops were to make up 90% of the total, for example, respondents may have turned against 
action not because the lack of support made it appear unjustified or futile, but because they 
UHVHQWHG WKH µIUHH ULGLQJ¶E\ WKH UHVW RI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\ In a similar vein, the 
experiment cannot fully elucidate why respondents ± many of whom will have only a hazy 
idea of what the UN and NATO are and do ± were nonetheless influenced by support from 
these organisations. None of this undermines our core findings, however.  While it would be 
interesting to identify the routes via which the public goes from international backing to 
support for military action, it would not alter our conclusion about the initial cause and 
ultimate effect.   
Moreover, our design, with manipulations of both active and passive backing, will 
have helped to plug what would otherwise have been substantial leakage between the two 
(with respondents considering the practical implications of a lack of passive support or the 
normative implications of having to send in troops alone). We can therefore have more 
confidence in the conclusion that active backing had a somewhat stronger effect on public 
support. It seems that some respondents wondered what was the use of moral support if 
British troops were still left to take action on their own. The point should not be overstated, 
since both dimensions of international backing influenced opinion ± an experimental 
coUURERUDWLRQ RI (LFKHQEHUJ¶V  DJJUHJDWH SROO DQDO\VLV  1RQHWKHOHVV WKHVH UHVXOWV
VXJJHVWDµSUHWW\SUXGHQW¶SXEOLFVHHNLQJPXOWLODWHUDOLVPOHVVIRULWVRZQVDNHDQGPRUHIRU
what it implies about the costs and benefits of British participation.  
 Probably the most surprising aspect of the results was the consistency of international 
backing effects. The effect of passive support was uniform across people with widely 
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different prior attitudes to military action, international engagement, and the particular 
international actors involved. Herrmann et al. (1999), while more successful in identifying 
predispositional moderators of contextual effects, also note that a number of such interactions 
did not emerge. They concluded that there are certain key features of a military scenario that 
weigh in public judgements across the board. Judging by our results, international backing ± 
and passive backing in particular ± can be added to the list of such features. Even active 
backing, although it had less power to sway those who were predisposed against military 
action, did at least cause some softening of opposition. All of this only goes to reinforce the 
point that very few people are staunchly pacifist or zealously militarist. For the large majority 
of the public, judgements about the use of force are a matter of balancing predispositions with 
strategic calculations based on the context.  
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Table I 
Methodological details of the surveys 
 
Wave Fieldwork dates 
[responses in first 
two days] 
N Response rate 
[denominator]19 
1 ± hypothetical questions; militarism; 
internationalism 
18-19 Jan 2010 
[100%] 
2,615 61% 
[contacts] 
2 ± survey experiment; psychological 
controls 
1-8 Feb 2010 
[91%] 
2,205 85% 
[Wave 1 respondents] 
3 ± attitudes to international 
organisations 
15-22 Feb 2010 
[86%] 
2,065 81% 
[Wave 1 respondents] 
 
  
                                                 
19
 Since members of the opt-in YouGov panel do not have a known probability of selection, it is not feasible to 
calculate a response rate taking into account all sources of non-response, including panel recruitment and 
retention. Here, then, response rates are in effect completion rates, representing the proportion of those asked to 
take part in that survey that agreed to do so. 
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Table II 
Acceptability of military action with different levels of international backing (N=2,202) 
 
HQGRUVLQJDFWLRQZLWK« 
 RIWKHVHDOVRHQGRUVLQJDFWLRQZLWK« 
 UN NATO EU USA Alone 
UN 72  -- 76 57 36 37 
NATO 67  81 -- 59 40 40 
EU 54  89 87 -- 49 46 
USA 30  84 88 73 -- 59 
Alone 31  83 83 66 56 -- 
None of these 8  -- -- -- -- -- 
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Table III 
Support for action by international backing: overall and by adversary military strength 
 
 
Overall 
 $GYHUVDU\¶VPLOLWDU\ 
 
 Small, untrained Large, trained 
 % N  % N % N 
Passive support        
UN 59 574  62 276 55 298 
NATO 57 577  59 260 55 317 
USA 50 531  53 237 47 294 
No significant support 46 510  49 242 43 268 
 Ȥ2 = 23.6, p < 0.01  Ȥ2 = 0.3, n.s. 
        
Active support        
10% British troops 59 1100  60 486 58 614 
90% British troops 47 1092  52 529 42 563 
 Ȥ2 = 29.4, p < 0.01   Ȥ2 =  5.4, p < 0.05 
        
Absolute contribution        
1,000 British troops 54 1158  58 538 51 620 
10,000 British troops 52 1034  53 477 50 557 
 Ȥ2 = 1.7 , n.s.  Ȥ2 = 1.8, n.s. 
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Table IV 
ANOVA in support for action by situational manipulations and predispositions 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
 F Ș  F Ș 
Support (passive backing) 7.9*** 0.10  11.1*** 0.13 
% of troops (active backing) 61.2*** 0.17  76.1*** 0.19 
Number of troops 2.5 0.03  0.9 0.02 
Adversary strength 7.6** 0.06  4.4** 0.05 
Support * % of troops 0.2 0.02  0.5 0.03 
Support * no. of troops 0.6 0.03  0.6 0.03 
Support * adversary 0.7 0.03  0.8 0.03 
% of troops * no. of troops 0.1 0.01  0.2 0.01 
% of troops * adversary 9.1*** 0.06  8.2*** 0.06 
No. of troops * adversary 0.1 0.01  0.5 0.02 
Force justified    76.2*** 0.19 
Force effective    98.7*** 0.21 
Internationalism    184.4*** 0.28 
Respect UN    6.1** 0.05 
Respect NATO    21.3*** 0.10 
Like/dislike USA    0.5 0.02 
       
R2 (adj.) 0.05 0.30 
N 2201 2061 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table V 
Interactions between international backing and predispositions in ANOVA models of 
support for action 
 
  Passive backing 
  
Active backing   
,QWHUDFWLRQZLWK« F Ș F Ș  Ĺ52 N 
Use of force generally justified 1.0 0.03  9.0*** 0.07  0.004 2201 
Use of force generally effective 1.4 0.04  11.7*** 0.08  0.008 2201 
Internationalism 1.3 0.04  0.3 0.01  0.003 2201 
Respect for UN 0.5 0.02  -- --  0.001 2061 
Respect for NATO 1.0 0.04  -- --  0.002 2061 
Like/dislike USA 0.8 0.03  -- --  0.001 2061 
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Figure 1 
Mean support for action by active support and prior beliefs about war 
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